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Abstract— The study examines the background of the 
audit committee from the aspect of professional 
affiliations, postgraduate qualifications and senior 
managerial experiences, in association with fraudulent 
financial reporting.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The study examines the background of the audit committee 
(AC) in association with fraudulent financial reporting (FFR). 
The study finds negative association between accounting 
affiliated ACs and fraud.  
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Three theories are utilised; the agency theory, resource 
dependence theory and behavioural decision theory, to form 
the basic framework of the study. Resource dependence theory 
(RDT) is related to audit committee expertise literature, while 
agency theory is the rationale for establishing the audit 
committee. The focus on director is stipulated on the three 
theories connected to it. Whereby, in the agency theory, the 
director or audit committee, acts as a monitoring mechanism 
on the preparers of financial statements (Shapiro, 2005). The 
RDT assumes, the director acts as a link between the firm and 
external resources, and functions as the provider of resources 
(Pfeffer, 1972). Hillman, Shropshire and Canella (2007) added 
that the board is also known as board capital, where directors 
as human capital providing expertise, experience and 
reputation to the organisation (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). 
These expertise and experience are identified as criteria to be 
used to determine experts as explained by the behavioural 
decision theory (BDT). 
The study includes two important criteria as the variables 
of interest, which describe the concept of human capital that 
measures the skills, abilities and knowledge, education and 
work experience as the most common dimensions of human 
capital. Subsequently, the study has three basic criteria for 
expertise as shown below:  
A. Professional qualification.  
The Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) (1999), Sarbanes 
Oxley Act (SOA) (2002), Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC) (2003), Smith Report (2003), Malaysian Code of 
Corporate Governance (MCCG) (2007), Defond, Hann and Hu 
(2005), and Qin (2006), have outlined this as one of the 
criteria for a financial expert.  
B. Academic qualification.  
Bonner and Lewis (1990), Busch (1997), and Rose, Rose 
and McKay (2007), have noted that experts learned through 
formalised training, and specialised skills that will make 
directors more effective. Consistent with Kim, Aldrich and 
Keister (2006) who theorise that formal education allows 
individuals to gain knowledge and skills, and earn credentials 
valued by others in the business community.  
C. Managerial experience.  
Abdolmohammadi and Shantaeu (1992), Choo (1996), 
Defond, Hann and Hu (2005) and Carcello, Hollingsworth and 
Neal (2006), noted that repetition to exposure and extensive 
effects of experience increases the knowledge and skills of 
experts. In addition Perkins (1993) noted that experienced 
managers’ cognitive structures appear to be organised by 
marketing functions, where in the marketing discipline, 
managerial knowledge is a critical element in many situations. 
Thus, gives support to the study’s third variable of interest. 
Prior research show evidence of a strong positive relationship 
between the length of job experience and performance, where 
those managers with longer tenure achieved higher 
performance (McEnrue, 1988), supported by Kor (2003), that 
past managerial experience contributes to the competence of 
the top management team. 
III. HYPHOTHESES 
A. Accounting Affiliated Audit Committee 
The agency theory suggests that firms with higher agency 
costs will attempt to reduce the cost by showing good quality 
financial reporting, possibly by appointing an accounting 
financial expert (Krishnan and Lee, 2009). In addition, 
Sharma, Naiker and Lee (2009), reveal that accounting experts 
on audit committees and greater board independence demand 
more frequent audit committee meetings when management 
adopts more aggressive accounting practices, which suggests 
that accounting experts on audit committees and independent 
directors have  important role in monitoring. Furthermore, 
Chen, Chang and Lee (2008) document that there is a positive 
association between professional training of assistants and 
financial performance in big sized firms when investigating 
the relationship between continuing professional education 
and firm’s performance. Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson and 
Thanks to Kulliyyah of Economic and Management 
Sciences, IIUM for funding this paper to this conference. 
Neal (2009) found that accounting experts are more likely to 
state that their audit committee drives the content of 
information and discusses alternative accounting treatment 
under GAAP, as well as specific judgments, estimates and 
assumptions involved in implementing a new accounting 
policy. Hence the following hypothesis is conjectured. 
H1: Firms with a higher proportion of audit committee 
members with professional accounting affiliations, 
are less likely to experience fraudulent financial 
reporting. 
B. Audit Committee with Postgraduate Qualification 
Formal education allows individuals to gain knowledge 
and skills, earn credentials valued by others in the business 
community (Kim, Aldrich and Keister, 2006), and the higher 
skill level in the workforce increases the production capacity, 
where one year’s increase in average educational attainment of 
the workforce will lead to an increase in labour productivity 
growth of 0.3 percent point as documented by Canton (2007). 
Thus, lends support to earlier research by Singer and Bruhns 
(1991) which determined that higher academic qualifications 
can enhance a candidate’s chance of success in a position, and 
conjectures the next hypotheses.  
H2: Firms with a higher proportion of audit committee 
members with postgraduate qualification, are less 
likely to experience fraudulent financial reporting. 
C. Audit Committee with Managerial Experience 
There is a strong positive relationship between the length 
of job experience among early-career managers and their 
performance, whereby those with longer tenure in the role of 
manager achieve higher performance (McEnrue, 1988). Also, 
past managerial experience contributes to the competence of 
the top management team (Kor, 2003). Hence, the study 
expects that audit committee with previous experience in 
senior management positions such as Chief Financial Officer 
(CFO), group accountants or financial controllers, or relevant 
positions, will result in a lower occurrence of financial 
statement fraud, as documented in Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney (1996), and Beasley, Carcello, and Hermanson 
(1999). Thus, the following hypothesis is conjectured. 
H3: Firms with audit committee members who have 
experiences in senior managerial positions, are less 
likely to experience fraudulent financial reporting. 
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN 
A. Sample  
The sample is limited to publicly traded firms because 
audit committees only exist in listed companies. Hence, the 
study has 28 fraud firms listed in Bursa Malaysia, to be 
matched with 84 nonfraud listed firms consistent with Lee, 
Yeh and Liu (2003), Owens-Jackson, Robinson and Shelton 
(2009), Zhao and Chen (2009), and Mustafa and Youssef 
(2010).  
 
B. Fraud firms selection 
To identify firms accused of fraud, the study searched the 
Securities Commission (SC) enforcement actions based on the 
offences as shown in Table I, consistent with Erickson, 
Hanlon and Maydew (2006), Zhao and Chen (2008) and 
Owens-Jackson, Robinson and Shelton (2009), the study 
compiles a matched sample of firms not accused of fraud. Lee, 
Yeh and Liu (2003) noted that the existing literature usually 
employs 1:1 or 1:2 matching sample. Where, for every 
financially distressed firm, one or two healthy firms are 
chosen as matching samples. However, in the real world 
financially distressed firms are far less than one half or one 
third. Thus, matching techniques may induce over sampling of 
financially distressed firms (Lee, Yeh and Liu, 2003).  
Each of the fraud firms is matched with three nonfraud 
firms (1:3), consistent with Zhao and Chen (2008) and 
Erickson, Hanlon and Maydew (2006), creating a choice based 
sample of 28 fraud, and 84 no fraud firms. They are first 
matched by the industry or sectors to which they belong, and 
then by the closeness to the size measured by total assets, 
consistent with Zhao and Chen (2009). The number of firms in 
the sampling is consistent with Peyrefitte, Fadil and Thomas 
(2002) with a final sample of 87 and Mustafa and Youssef 
(2010) that examine 28 cases of misappropriation of assets. 
Data was hand collected from publicly available data.  
 
TABLE I.          SUMMARY OF OFFENCES 
 
List of offences Sections Acts 
Making a statement that is 
misleading in material particulars. 
Issued a prospectus contained 
misleading information. 
Submission of false information to 
Securities Commission. 
Making false statements in 
documents, which is used in the 
preparation of financial statements 
contained in annual report. 
Section 
176 
Capital 
Market 
Securities 
Act 2007 
False or misleading documents or 
information. 
Disclosure of information to SC 
that is false or misleading, 
material omission; or misleading 
or deceptive.  
32B 
(Deleted) 
33E 
 
152(2) 
 
Securities 
Commissi
on Act 
1993 
 
False reports to Commission, 
stock exchange or recognized 
clearing 
house.  
 
122B 
 
Securities 
Industry 
Acts 1983 
Criminal Breach of Trust  Penal Code 
V. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION  
A. Univariate Analysis 
Table II shows univariate analysis on the descriptive of 
mean, standard deviation, median, minimum and maximum 
for whole sample. Results show that mean for audit committee 
members with senior managerial experience, EXP, is higher 
than those with accounting affiliations (ACC) and 
postgraduate qualifications (PG). Board size has a mean of 
7.17. Audit committee independence (ACINDP) reached the 
required 2/3 majority of independence as proposed in the 
MCCG, and a mean of 0.6914.  
For the t-test as in Table II, the ACINDP has a 
significant p value at 5 percent level, suggesting there is a 
difference between fraud and nonfraud firms where audit 
committees independence, is concerned. This is consistent 
with Abbott, Parker and Peter (2004), and Bronson, Carcello, 
Hollingsworth and Neal (2009) that show significant audit 
committee independence between going concern reports and 
clean reports firms. 
MGTOWN is significant too, suggesting managerial 
ownership might have some influence to FFR which is 
consistent with Abbott, Parker and Peter (2004). The result 
shows a nonsignificant board size and firms’ size between 
fraud and nonfraud firms’ consistent with Carcello and Nagy 
(2004), suggesting that board’s size has no influence on FFR. 
B. Correlation 
Table III, shows the correlation matrix between fraud 
and other variables. From the table, ACC has a negative and 
significant association with fraud, suggesting that audit 
committee with professional qualification is negatively 
associated with fraud, or the higher the number of accounting 
affiliated audit committees, the lower the incidence of fraud. 
However, ACC is positively significant with management 
ownership, suggesting as management ownership increases, 
the number of accounting affiliated audit committees increases 
too.  
ACSIZE, is positive and significantly associated to board 
size, consistent with Baxter and Cotter (2009). This is because 
as the number of board size increases, the number of audit 
committee increases too since, audit committee members are 
also among the board members. MGTOWN has a negative 
and significant relationship with fraud, firms’ size and age 
listed, consistent with Mitra, Hossain and Deis (2007) that 
managers with high ownership interest are less likely to 
misreport financial results. This may also suggest that, higher 
number of management ownership may help to reduce the 
likelihood of fraud and is consistent with the t-test shown in 
Table II earlier.   
C. Discussion  
The univariate tests of the shows leverage, management 
ownership and audit committee independence, are significant 
to differentiate between the frauds and nonfraud firms. The 
correlation analysis supports the univariate analysis for 
management ownership where, it is found that management 
ownership is negative and significantly related to fraud.  The  
 
TABLE II.          UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 
Variable 
N=112 
Mean S.D Min Median Max Mean diff. F tests p value 
FRAUD 0.25 0.435 0 0 1    
ACC 0.3403 0.1674 0 0.3333 1 -0.089 1.148 0.286 
EXP 0.8403 0.2279 0 1 1 0.064 1.909 0.170 
PG 0.2699 0.2414 0 0.3333 1 0.028 3.319 0.071* 
ACSIZE 3.24 0.651 2 3 5 -0.024 0.364 0.547 
MGTOWN 16.9384 19.8225 0 8.002 88.76 -9.455 6.675 0.011** 
BODSIZE 7.17 1.907 3 7 12 -0.369 0.005 0.944 
ACINDP 0.6914 0.1177 0.33 0.6914 1 -0.009 6.446 0.013** 
AGELIST 11.1339 10.864 0 9 51 -0.131 0.010 0.922 
FIRMSIZE 11.9852 2.3871 0 11.9747 16.15 -0.887 1.514 0.221 
LEV 0.5556 0.9195 0 0.3707 7.31 0.202 0.535 0.466 
*,**significant at 5% level (2-tailed and 1% level (2-tailed) 
 
Note :  ACC=Proportion of AC members with professional accounting affiliations; EXP=Proportion of AC members with senior managerial 
experience; PG=Proportion of AC members with postgraduate qualifications. ACSIZE=Number of AC member; MGTOWN=Percentage of 
shares owned by directors; BODSIZE=Number of directors on board; ACINDP=Proportion of independent AC members to size of AC; 
AGELIST=Total number of years the company had been listed; FIRMSIZE=Natural log of firm’ total assets; LEV=Total liabilities to total 
assets; 
 
 
correlation also shows, audit committee directors with 
accounting affiliation is negative and significantly related to 
fraud, hence supports H1. Subsequently, the result conforms 
prior study by Sharma, Naiker and Lee (2009) that accounting 
experts on audit committee have an important role in 
monitoring, and gives better financial reporting quality (Jaggi 
and Leung, 2007). 
In addition, Defond, Hann and Hu (2005) note that 
market would react favourably to the appointments of 
specialised skills possessed by accounting financial experts, 
since it makes directors more effective in executing the audit 
committee’s primary responsibilities of ensuring high quality 
financial reporting. It is also supported by Krishnan and 
Visvanathan (2009), where accounting expertise contributes to 
greater monitoring by the audit committee, and also lends 
support to Gendron and Bedard (2006), that document the 
more professional accountants on audit committees, the more 
effective  the audit committee when adhering to best practices. 
The negative association between management 
ownership and fraud lends support to earlier research by Baek, 
Johnson and Kim (2009) that the level of managerial 
ownership influences the level of discretionary disclosure 
activities of the firm, and O’Connor, Priem, Coombs and 
Gilley (2006), where large Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
stock option grants were sometimes associated with a lower 
incidence of fraudulent financial reporting. The results also 
lend support to prior studies such as O’Connor, Priem, 
Coombs and Gilley (2006) and Chen, Guo and Mande (2006).  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The univariate tests of FFR, highlights the differences 
between fraud and nonfraud firms. It shows that management 
ownership, postgraduate qualifications and audit committee 
independence, have significant differences between the sample 
and the control firms. In addition, correlation also shows the 
significant negative association between accounting affiliated 
audit committees and fraud.  Hence support the RDT, that 
audit committee experts link the firms with external resources, 
such as expertise and experience (as identified from BDT), to 
reduce the likeliness of fraudulent reporting. Thus, the 
findings are consistent with the International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC) Proposed Framework for International 
Education Standards for Professional Accountant, Exposure 
Draft 2009 (IFAC, 2009). Where the Framework is targeted to 
meet the needs of IFAC member bodies, but is relevant to a 
wide range of accounting education stakeholders, including, 
accounting faculty at universities, employers of professional 
accountants, professional accountants, prospective 
professional accountants, and anyone interested in the work of 
the International Accounting Education Standard Board 
(IAESB). 
The study is without limitation that it has a small sample, 
and strict definition of fraudulent financial reporting that is 
consistent with prior literatures. However, for future research 
the area could be extended to examine further the managerial 
ownership, or ownership structure’s impact on fraudulent 
financial reporting, and the background of audit committees. 
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